Bava Kamma 98

Chapter 98

א ותני זכתה
1 but read in the text 'she would become entitled to it'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In accordance with the view of Rabbah. ');"><sup>1</sup></span> May we say that there is on this point<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In which Rabbah and R. Hisda differ. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
ב לימא כתנאי בת ישראל שנשאת לגר ונתעברה ממנו וחבל בה בחיי הגר נותן דמי ולדות לגר לאחר מיתת הגר תני חדא חייב ותני חדא פטור מאי לאו תנאי נינהו לרבה ודאי תנאי היא אלא לרב חסדא מי לימא תנאי היא
2 a difference between Tannaitic authorities? [For it was taught:] If a daughter of an Israelite was married to a proselyte and became pregnant by him, and a blow was given her during the lifetime of the proselyte,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And a miscarriage resulted. ');"><sup>3</sup></span> the compensation for the loss of the embryos will be given to the proselyte. But if after the death of the proselyte!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. if the blow was given after the death of the proselyte. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
ג ל"ק הא רבנן הא רשב"ג
3 — One Baraitha teaches that there would be liability, whereas another Baraitha teaches that there would be no liability. Now, does this not show that Tannaim differ on this [point]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., whether the mother acquires a title to the embryos on the death of her husband, the proselyte, or not. ');"><sup>5</sup></span> According to Rabbah there is certainly a difference between Tannaim on this matter.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He therefore followed the view of the former Baraitha laying down liability. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
ד אי רשב"ג מאי אריא לאחר מיתה אפי' מחיים נמי אית לה פלגא מחיים אית לה פלגא לאחר מיתה כוליה
4 But what of R. Hisda?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating exemption. ');"><sup>7</sup></span> Must he also hold that Tannaim were divided on it? — [No; he may argue that] there is no difficulty,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., no contradiction between the two Baraithas, which do not deal with the payment for the loss of the embryos but with the payment for the loss of the increment in the value of the woman herself due to the embryos. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
ה ואיבעית אימא הא והא רשב"ג כאן בשבח ולדות כאן בדמי ולדות
5 as one [Baraitha] accepts the view of the Rabbis<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Maintaining that the payment for the loss of the increment in the value of the woman herself also belongs to the husband, so that where he was a proselyte dying without issue there would be no liability at all upon the defendant. ');"><sup>9</sup></span> whereas the other follows that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to whom the payment for the loss of the increment in the value of the woman herself has to be shared by the mother and father, so that where he was a proselyte dying without issue she will surely not forfeit her due, but as to the embryos, all agree that the woman acquires in no circumstance title to them. ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
ו אמרי משבח ולדות לישמע דמי ולדות ומדרשב"ג לישמע לרבנן
6 But if [the Baraitha which says that there is liability follows the view of] R. Simeon b. Gamaliel, why speak only of compensation after the death [of the proselyte]? Would she even during [his] lifetime not have [a half of the payment]? — During [his] lifetime she would have only a half, whereas after death she would have the whole.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For since the mother is a joint plaintiff with her husband regarding this payment, where he was a proselyte dying without issue she will remain the sole plaintiff and thus be entitled to the full payment. ');"><sup>11</sup></span> Or if you wish you may say that both this [Baraitha]<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating liability. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
ז אמרי לא שבח ולדות דשייכא ידה בגוייהו זכיא בהו בכולהו דמי ולדות דלא שייכא ידה בגוייהו לא זכיא בהו כלל:
7 and the other follow the view of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to whom the payment for the loss of the increment in the value of the woman herself has to be shared by the mother and father, so that where he was a proselyte dying without issue she will surely not forfeit her due, but as to the embryos, all agree that the woman acquires in no circumstance title to them. ');"><sup>10</sup></span> but while one<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating liability. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
ח בעי מיניה רב ייבא סבא מר"נ המחזיק בשטרותיו של גר מהו מאן דמחזיק בשטרא אדעתיה דארעא הוא דמחזיק ובארעא הא לא אחזיק ושטרא נמי לא קנה דלאו דעתיה אשטרא או דלמא דעתיה נמי אשטרא
8 deals with the increase in the value [of the woman caused] by the embryos, the other<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating exemption. ');"><sup>13</sup></span> refers to the compensation for the loss of the value of the embryos [themselves].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To which the mother was never a plaintiff. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
ט א"ל עני מורי וכי לצור ע"פ צלוחיתו הוא צריך א"ל לצור ולצור
9 I would here ask, why not derive from the rule<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating liability. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> regarding the increased value due to the embryos the other rule regarding the value of the embryos themselves?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That payment should be made to the mother, in contradiction to the view of R. Hisda. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
י אמר רבה משכונו של ישראל ביד גר ומת הגר ובא ישראל אחר והחזיק בו מוציאין אותו מידו מ"ט כיון דמית ליה גר פקע ליה שעבודיה
10 And again, why not derive from the ruling<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Stating liability. ');"><sup>12</sup></span> of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel also the ruling of the Rabbis?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [That she should have the whole where the proselyte husband is no longer alive.] ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
יא משכונו של גר ביד ישראל ומת הגר ובא ישראל אחר והחזיק בו זה קנה כנגד מעותיו וזה קנה את השאר
11 — It may, however, be said that this could not be done. For as regards the increased value [of the woman due] to the embryos, seeing that she has some hold upon it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even during the lifetime of her husband. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> she can acquire a title to the whole of it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' At the demise of the proselyte without any legal issue. ');"><sup>18</sup></span>
יב ואמאי תקני ליה חצירו דהאמר רבי יוסי בר חנינא חצירו של אדם קונה לו שלא מדעתו
12 whereas in regard to the compensation for the embryos themselves, on which she has no hold,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 282, n. 10. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> she can acquire no title to them at all.
יג אמרי הכא במאי עסקינן דליתיה כל היכא דאיתא לדידיה דאי בעי מקני [מצי] קני קניא ליה [נמי] חצירו כל היכא דליתיה לדידיה דאי בעי הוא למיקני לא מצי קני חצירו נמי לא קניא
13 R. Yeba the Elder enquired of R. Nahman: If a man has taken possession of the deeds of a proselyte,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 282, n. 11. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> what is the legal position? [Shall we say that] a man who takes possession of a deed does so with intent to acquire the land [specified in the document], but has thereby not taken possession of the land, nor does he even acquire title to the deed, since his intent was not to obtain the deed?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the mere value of the paper of the deed. ');"><sup>21</sup></span>
יד והלכתא דליתיה בחצירו דלא קנה:
14 Or [shall we] perhaps [say] that his intent was to obtain the deed also?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the mere value of the paper of the deed. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> — He<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Nahman. ');"><sup>22</sup></span>
טו <big><strong>מתני׳</strong></big> החופר בור ברה"י ופתחו לרה"ר או ברה"ר ופתחו לרה"י ברה"י ופתחו לרה"י אחר חייב:
15 said to him: Tell me, Sir, could he need it to cover the mouth of his flask? — He<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Yeba. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> replied: Yes indeed, [he could need it] to cover[ the flask].
טז <big><strong>גמ׳</strong></big> ת"ר החופר בור ברה"י ופתחו לרה"ר (ברה"ר ופתחו לרה"י) חייב וזהו בור האמור בתורה דברי ר' ישמעאל ר"ע אומר הפקיר רשותו ולא הפקיר בורו זהו בור האמור בתורה
16 Rabbah stated: If the pledge of an Israelite is in the hands of a proselyte [creditor], and the proselyte dies [without any legal issue] and another Israelite comes along and takes possession of it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 282, n. 11. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> it would be taken away from him, the reason being that as the proselyte has died, the lien he had upon the pledge has disappeared. But if a pledge of a proselyte [debtor] is in the hands of an Israelite, and the proselyte dies and another Israelite comes along and takes possession of it, the creditor would become owner of the pledge to the extent of the amount due to him, while the one who took possession of it would own the balance. Why should the premises [of the creditor where the pledge was kept] not render him the owner [of the whole pledge]? Did not R. Jose b. Hanina say that a man's premises effect a legal transfer [of ownerless property placed there] even without his knowledge? — It may be said that we are dealing here with a case where the creditor was not there.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [I.e., 'in town' (Rashi), or (according to Tosaf.) 'beside the premises,' v. B.M. 11a: 'non-guarded premises confer title only when the owner is standing beside them.'] ');"><sup>24</sup></span>
יז אמר רבה בבור ברה"ר כ"ע לא פליגי דמיחייב מ"ט אמר קרא (שמות כא, לג) כי יפתח וכי יכרה אם על פתיחה חייב על כרייה לא כל שכן אלא שעל עסקי פתיחה ועל עסקי כרייה באה לו לא נחלקו אלא
17 For it is only where he himself<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the owner of the premises. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> is there,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [I.e., 'in town' (Rashi), or (according to Tosaf.) 'beside the premises,' v. B.M. 11a: 'non-guarded premises confer title only when the owner is standing beside them.'] ');"><sup>24</sup></span> in which case should he so desire he would be able to take possession of it,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the pledge or any other ownerless article. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> that his premises could [act on his behalf and] effect the transfer, whereas where he himself<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the owner of the premises. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> was absent, in which case were he to desire to acquire title to it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the pledge or any other ownerless article. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> he would have been unable to take possession of it, his premises could similarly not effect a transfer. But the law is that it is only where it [the pledge] was not [kept] in the [creditor's] premises that he would acquire no title to it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For where the pledge was kept in the creditor's premises at the time of the demise of the proselyte without issue, the creditor would acquire title to the whole of it, though the creditor were out of town (Rashi). [Tosaf. renders, 'where the creditor was not beside the premises.'] ');"><sup>27</sup></span> <b><i>MISHNAH</i></b>. IF A MAN DIGS A PIT IN PRIVATE GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO A PUBLIC PLACE, OR IF HE DIGS IT IN PUBLIC GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO PRIVATE PROPERTY, OR AGAIN, IF HE DIGS IT IN PRIVATE GROUND AND OPENS IT ON TO THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER, HE BECOMES LIABLE<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Gemara. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> [FOR ANY DAMAGE THAT MAY RESULT]. <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. Our Rabbis taught: If a man digs a pit on private ground and opens it on to a public place, he becomes liable, and this is the Pit of which the Torah<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33-34 ');"><sup>29</sup></span> speaks. So R. Ishmael. R. Akiba, however, says: When a man abandons his premises without, however, abandoning his pit, this is the Pit of which the Torah<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33-34 ');"><sup>29</sup></span> speaks. Rabbah thereupon said: In the case of a pit on public ground there is no difference of opinion that there should be liability. What is the reason? — Scripture says, If a man open or if a man dig.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXI, 33-34 ');"><sup>29</sup></span> Now, if for mere opening there is liability, should there not be so all the more in the case of digging? [Why then mention digging at all?] Scripture must therefore mean to imply that it is on account of the act of opening and on account of the act of digging that the liability is at all brought upon him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. where the ground of the pit that did the actual damage was not his at all. ');"><sup>30</sup></span> A difference arises